{"id":51686,"date":"2025-11-05T04:25:28","date_gmt":"2025-11-05T11:25:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/timesandseasons.org\/?p=51686"},"modified":"2025-11-09T19:37:38","modified_gmt":"2025-11-10T02:37:38","slug":"polygamy-guest-post","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/timesandseasons.org\/index.php\/2025\/11\/polygamy-guest-post\/","title":{"rendered":"What Conditions Might Generate a Social Preference for Polygamy?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Guest post by Paul Burnham<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

What Conditions Might Generate a Social Preference for Polygyny?<\/h1>\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

During the occasional discussions of polygyny in Church literature and on the Bloggernacle, I see two competing narratives\u2014a religious narrative and a romantic narrative. In the religious narrative, God\u2019s will must always prevail and on occasion His will has been that polygyny be practiced. In the romantic narrative, pair-bonding is the most important feature of marriage and polygyny is antithetical to true pair-bonding, making it unthinkable under any circumstances. But I think there is a third narrative\u2014what I call a quasi-Darwinian narrative that eschews both religion and romance. That narrative views marriage, whether monogamous or polygamous, solely as an effort to maximize one\u2019s genetic legacy (i.e., number of descendants).[1]<\/a> As I see it, both the religious and romantic narratives are selective subsets of the quasi-Darwinian narrative. The former is designed to further the pro-polygyny interests of elite men, and the latter is designed to further the anti-polygyny interests of elite women. Both narratives ignore the interests of non-elite men and women, which, it turns out, are not the same as those of the elites of the same sex. I propose to rectify that.<\/p>\n

To do so, I propose to perform a set of simulations to see how the full quasi-Darwinian narrative would play out under different scenarios. In these simulations, religion and romance are disregarded. Both men and women have only one goal\u2014to maximize their number of descendants. However, marriage decisions in these simulations are entirely female driven. Men are assumed to have different levels of suitability as a father (which I refer to as their \u201cvalue\u201d or \u201cresources\u201d) and women can select the one they want\u2014even if that man has already been selected by somebody else.<\/p>\n

The goal of the exercise is to generate two types of results:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. To identify which women would choose to be plural wives if such were allowed, and<\/li>\n
  2. To identify conditions under which a majority of the adult population would be better off if polygyny were allowed.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Underlying the analysis are assumptions that (a) reproduction occurs only within marriage, and (b) marriage is subject to regulation\u2014whether by a government, a religion, or nonreligious cultural traditions\u2014and that such regulation can only be imposed with the consent of those being regulated. Without such regulation, the second type of result is irrelevant, and one could expect polygyny to effectively occur under any circumstances in which even one woman would find it to her advantage to be a man\u2019s secondary partner.<\/p>\n

    Details and Assumptions<\/h2>\n

    The data used for these simulations are entirely synthetic.[2]<\/a> All relevant characteristics of both men and women are reduced to a single number which allows me to rank them and, in the case of men, place a value on them. This has the advantage of providing unambiguous results. A disadvantage is that it is easy to inadvertently predetermine the results by selecting a particular method of synthesizing the data.<\/p>\n

    Universal Assumptions<\/h3>\n

    To mitigate that disadvantage, I create different scenarios under which to perform the simulations. All those scenarios involve changing the assumptions about men. The following assumptions about women apply in each scenario:<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Eighteen women are ranked by their inherent ability to maximize their number of descendants, whether through greater fertility (always nonzero) or superior mothering\/providing skills (however broadly you want to define those). The rankings are known to and accepted by all parties.<\/li>\n
    2. Women choose their husbands in order of their rank\u2014that is, the highest-ranking woman gets first choice, and the lowest-ranking woman chooses last. Men have no say in marriage decisions.<\/li>\n
    3. Women always choose the husband who can provide the most resources to their children, after factoring in the number of other wives with whom those resources must be equally divided. Children\u2019s survival rates are implicitly a function of both their mother\u2019s and father\u2019s resources, but only the latter enters into a woman\u2019s marriage choice.<\/li>\n
    4. A first wife has no power to veto the marriage of her husband to additional wives if those women choose to be plural wives to her husband. (Allowing first wives a veto would render the exercise trivial\u2014polygyny would simply never happen.) A first wife can, however, reconsider her own choice if additional wives insert themselves. Such reconsideration must wait until all women have made their initial choice.[3]<\/a><\/li>\n
    5. There are no synergies among sister wives. Each wife\u2019s children benefit solely from their own mother\u2019s resources and her share of the father\u2019s resources.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Also unchanging among scenarios are the rules for determining when polygyny is socially preferred to monogamy. For women, the question is complicated. As part of the simulation, I consider the full value associated with a woman\u2019s husband under monogamy and compare it to the value they would receive from their husband (not necessarily the same man) under polygyny, when they may only receive a portion of his total value. The system generating the highest value for a woman determines how she would vote.<\/p>\n

      I evaluate men\u2019s preference for a polygamous or monogamous system solely in terms of the number and ranks of the wives they would end up with. If a polygamous system gave them multiple wives, they would prefer that system. If it left them unmarried, they would prefer a monogamous system. If they ended up with a single wife under polygyny, then their vote would be determined by comparing the ranks of the wives under each system. I sum the value of the quantity (19 \u2013 rank) over all their wives under each system to determine their votes.<\/p>\n

      The Distribution of Men\u2019s Value<\/h3>\n

      Men\u2019s value may derive from the quality of time spent directly with the children (\u201cfathering skills\u201d) and\/or the level of outside support (in the form of food, shelter, clothing, etc) that they can provide (\u201cproviding skills\u201d).[4]<\/a> I test four basic distributions of men\u2019s value. Each distribution represents a different mix between fathering skills and providing skills. One should interpret the most skewed distributions as placing more weight on the providing aspect than on the fathering aspect.\u00a0 The basic distributions, in order of skewness (most skewed to least), are as follows:<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. The \u201cnonlinear inverse rank\u201d (NIR) distribution<\/em>. Values equal the square of (19 – rank) and range from 324 (182<\/sup>) for the highest-ranked man to 1 for the lowest-ranked man (little more than a sperm donor). This distribution tracks most closely to the empirically observed distribution of income, which can be considered a proxy for \u201cproviding skills\u201d.<\/li>\n
      2. The \u201cinverse rank\u201d (IR) distribution<\/em>. Values range linearly from 18 for the highest-ranked man to 1 for the lowest (still just a sperm donor).<\/li>\n
      3. The \u201cnormal\u201d distribution<\/em>. Instead of a linear distribution, the values are clustered around 9.5 with a standard deviation of 4. This is an alternative to the IR scenario that tracks more closely with empirical evidence that the distributions of many attributes that one could consider proxies for fathering skills tend to resemble a normal distribution (or bell curve) more than a linear distribution.<\/li>\n
      4. The \u201cequal\u201d distribution<\/em> in which all men have the same value. This is not a realistic distribution of either providing skills or fathering skills but is included to illustrate the implications of that extreme when there is a surplus of women.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        I also consider a variation on the two inverse rank distributions in which the lowest-ranked men are more competitive in terms of their skills. They are as follows:<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. The \u201cmodified nonlinear inverse rank\u201d (MNIR) distribution<\/em>. Values equal the square of (35 \u2013 rank) such that the highest-ranked man has a value of four times that of the lowest-ranked man. Reducing the ratio of highest value to lowest value from 324:1 (under the NIR distribution) to 4:1 (under the MNIR distribution) implies a significant degree of policy-driven income redistribution (e.g., a highly progressive income tax coupled with a generous earned income credit). Such a radical policy would seem politically implausible, but I include it for illustrative purposes.<\/li>\n
        2. The \u201cmodified inverse rank\u201d (MIR) distribution<\/em>. Values equal (35 \u2013 rank) such that the highest-ranked man has a value (34) double that of the lowest-ranked man (17). This distribution is included to document the most unequal conditions under which polygyny would attract zero votes.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          Table 1 illustrates the six distributions by showing the values of the 1st<\/sup>, 7th<\/sup>, and 12th<\/sup> ranked men relative to that of the 18th<\/sup>-ranked man (normalized to 1).<\/p>\n

           <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          Table 1: Men\u2019s Relative Values by Distribution Type<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          <\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          <\/td>\nNIR<\/td>\nIR<\/td>\nNormal<\/td>\nEqual<\/td>\nMNIR<\/td>\nMIR<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Value of\u2026<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          1st-ranked man<\/td>\n324<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n17.2<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n4.00<\/td>\n2.00<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          7th-ranked man<\/td>\n144<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n11.3<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n2.71<\/td>\n1.65<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          12th-ranked man<\/td>\n49<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n8.0<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1.83<\/td>\n1.35<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          18th-ranked man<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1.0<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1.00<\/td>\n1.00<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          <\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

           <\/p>\n

          The Balance of the Population between the Sexes<\/h3>\n

          The base assumption is that of a population that is balanced in terms of sex. Such an assumption is appealing because it approximates the modern world and eliminates one of the primary justifications for historical polygyny.[5]<\/a> But I think it is useful to determine just how valid the historical justification was. To do that, I repeat the simulations twice, in each case using a population of 18 women and 12 men. In the first case, I eliminate the six lowest-ranked men; in the other case, I eliminate the six highest-ranked men. Finally, I briefly discuss the possibility of polyandry when there is a surplus of men.<\/p>\n

          Results with a balanced population<\/h2>\n

          In a monogamous system, every woman would choose the husband of the same rank as herself, regardless of how the men\u2019s resources are distributed. That result serves as the baseline against which the results in a polygamous system are compared under each of the six distributions of male value.<\/p>\n

          I focus with the inverse rank distribution because its results are the easiest to explain of all the simulations in which polygyny is chosen by some women.<\/p>\n

          Inverse rank distribution<\/h3>\n

          Under this distribution, the top ten women would choose the man of corresponding rank to be their husband. Of the remaining eight women, six would choose to become plural wives of the six highest-ranked men; each of the other two would choose to be the only wife of a man ranked higher than herself. The left side of Table 2 lists the women from 1 to 18 and shows the rank of the man each would select. The right side of Table 2 lists the men from 1 to 18 and shows which women would select them.<\/p>\n

          This result is stable\u2014the higher-ranked women could not do better by changing their choices.[6]<\/a> The implications for men are that the six highest-ranked men would have two wives, the six lowest-ranked men would have no wives and the six in the middle would have one wife.<\/p>\n

          It is immediately obvious that the six highest-ranked men would be better off under polygyny because they would have multiple wives and could therefore expect more children. It is equally obvious that the six lowest-ranked men would be worse off under polygyny because they would have no wives or children at all. Of the middle six, four would end up with the same wife they would get under monogamy; the other two would end up with a lower-ranked wife than they would get under monogamy. Thus, men would cast 6 votes in favor or polygyny and 8 votes in favor of monogamy. The other 4 would be indifferent.<\/p>\n

           <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          Table 2: Results in a Polygamous System Under the Inverse Rank Distribution of Men\u2019s Values<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          By Women\u2019s Rank<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/td>\nBy Men\u2019s Rank<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Women\u2019s rank<\/td>\nHusband\u2019s rank<\/td>\n<\/td>\nMen\u2019s rank<\/td>\nRank of first wife<\/td>\nRank of second wife<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          1<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          2<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          3<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n14<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n17<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          6<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          7<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n7<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          8<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n8<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          9<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n9<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          10<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n10<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          11<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n13<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          12<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n16<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          13<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n<\/td>\n13<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          14<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/td>\n14<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          15<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/td>\n15<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          16<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n<\/td>\n16<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          17<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/td>\n17<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          18<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n<\/td>\n18<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\nNone<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

           <\/p>\n

          For women, the results are the opposite. The six highest-ranked women would be worse off under polygyny because they would only benefit from half of their husband\u2019s resources. The women choosing to become second wives would be better off because half of the resources of their high-ranking husbands is still more than the resources of the lower-ranking husband they would get under monogamy. Four of the remaining six women would get the same husband they would get under monogamy; the other two would prefer polygyny even though they would not be plural wives because they would end up with higher-ranked husbands than they would under monogamy. Thus, women would cast 8 votes in favor of polygyny and 6 votes in favor of monogamy. The other 4 would be indifferent.<\/p>\n

          Overall, the vote would be a 14-14 tie. What is interesting, however, is that more votes for a monogamous system would come from men than from women.<\/p>\n

          Other distributions<\/h3>\n

          Table A-1 shows the results under all six distributions of men\u2019s values with a balanced population. It shows that none of the distributions results in polygyny being the socially preferred system. Furthermore, it shows that support for polygyny is not a monotonic function of the inequality of men\u2019s values. Polygyny gets no support under the most equal distributions\u2014that is, when the value of the lowest-ranked man is at least half that of the highest-ranked man. Similarly, monogamy is the socially preferred system when the distribution of men\u2019s values is the most unequal because the concentration of value attracts a concentration of wives in a polygamous system and leaves more men without wives and therefore in favor of a monogamous system. In the middle, the interests of men and women exactly offset each other and result in tie votes. Under any distribution in which polygyny would be preferred by anybody, more women would support it than men.<\/p>\n

          Results with a surplus of women<\/h2>\n

          These simulations removed six men from the population, leaving a surplus of women. In a monogamous system, the top 12 women would choose the husband with the closest rank to her own\u20141 through 12 if the bottom six men are removed and 7 through 18 if the top six are removed. In either case, the bottom six women would remain unmarried. That result serves as the baseline against which the results in a polygamous system are compared under each of the six male value distributions and removal rules (that is, bottom six or top six).<\/p>\n

          Inverse rank distribution<\/h3>\n

          Removing even a single male from the exercise has major implications for the social preference for polygyny. The simplest results to understand are those for the IR distribution in which the vote between polygyny and monogamy was a tie when the population was balanced. The absence of the lowest-ranked male has implications only for the lowest-ranked woman, who would remain unmarried under monogamy. Clearly, she would prefer polygyny to remaining unmarried, but she also preferred polygyny when the population was balanced so her vote would not change. This scenario does, however, remove one male vote for monogamy, which breaks the tie and makes polygyny the socially preferred system. The removal of all six of the lowest-ranked men who would remain unmarried under polygyny in the balanced population scenario would not change any woman\u2019s vote but would eliminate six male votes for monogamy and thereby shift the social preference even further in favor of polygyny.<\/p>\n

          Would the social preference be different if it were the highest-ranked men (who supported polygyny when the population was balanced) who were removed instead of the lowest-ranked men? Not actually that much. A simulation using the IR distribution but removing the six highest-ranked men yielded the following results:<\/p>\n