To the point of Peirce’s religion, I don’t think that’s what he meant. Rather he thought the principle Jesus taught applied here. His religion is a bit mysterious to me. He was raised unitarian at a time that was common for the intellectual class. (Emerson was unitarian too) However he converted to trinitarianism and saw significance to that. He opposed James’ view of religion that saw it judged purely in terms of what worked in a loose sense for the individual. He felt religion was an empirical matter as with everything else with empirical claims. (Indeed that distinction over the pragmatic maxim was the major break between the two and it’s quite significant) Yet his own religious views seem an odd mixture of Christianity and something akin to Buddhism. Some have drawn similarities with the process theology of Whitehead and Hartshorne although I think that’s pushing it in places. But he’s definitely a process styled thinker.
]]>2) I think Mead’s distinction between the “I” and the “me” are a much better approach to an ethics of belief. Whereas the “I” is the pre-reflexive will that acts, the “me” is a constructed (re)presentation of the “I” that is intrinsically social and normative in nature. Thus, if we want discuss the ethics of belief, it would be much more profitable to discuss the ethics of attributing beliefs to any person’s “me” – which is much closer to an ethics of claims than an ethics of beliefs.
3) Did Peirce really think that that is what Jesus literally meant about fruits? If so, that’s really sad.
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