(But then again, not being a philosopher, I could be interpreting the difference incorrectly…)

This sounds like an argument that James would make to support Peirce. :)

I’m looking forward to your next post. Thanks again.

Relative to religious belief though I think many simply will find James’ more utilitarian approach problematic though even if in the ideal limit utilitarian approaches would converge with Peirce’s. That said, as my next post will go through, there’s a certain similarity between James and Peirce when we turn to a person’s fixed beliefs.

The problem with an absent truth such as it functions in Peirce is a very valid criticism. In the late 20th century that was why Putnam with his style of neo-pragmatism came up with Warranted Assertability. That’s different from James in being concerned less with utilitarian issues and more with immediate rational justification. There’s a sense where epistemology as critiquing our beliefs there and then in terms of the information we have is important. With a Peircean model you end up much more doing ones duty in terms of inquiry whereas the other type of question seems important as part of doing that duty. That’ll come up in how I pursue these questions in future posts in this series.

I really do appreciate any feedback – especially on points that might not be clear to people without a background in philosophy. The idea is to make it approachable to people who aren’t specialists but have a general college background. That means touching on ideas and getting their general thrust without necessarily getting into the weeds.

Chris, I tend to see there being less inherent conflict between science and religion. To my eyes instead of the two separate spheres or inherently conflicting spheres we simply have less rigorous common sense approaches to ideas versus careful rigorous ideas. If there is a conflict it’s usually because one side or the other has misunderstood the topic in question or simply is acting dogmatically and attempting to stop inquiry. (There’s no shortage of ill informed dogmatism cutting off inquiry on both sides) This is a very different approach than we typically see but is very much within the Peircean approach.

It’s interesting as after I wrote the above this morning I was listening to the Maxwell Institute podcast on universities and the rise of modern Mormonism. (It’s a great interview and definitely makes me want to buy the book – there’s a review over at Juvenile Instructor as well) There we saw a tension between traditional 19th century Mormonism and the newly university educated Mormons. The conflicts popped up primarily in evolution but also higher criticism and even pragmatism. (Presumably the pragmatism of Dewey and James since Peirce just wasn’t well know at the time) I found some of the things discussed there relevant for thinking about these issues in Peirce. (I won’t give away yet how — although a quick perusal of his most famous paper “The Fixation of Belief” will give some hints)

Rather truth is what experience would result in a community believing if inquiry was carried on indefinitely

This also looks intriguing,

In contrast for religion to function it seems that many key aspects must be comprehensible both for the typical believer as well as the more cautious and informed investigator.

Religion has to function practically and factually. Quite the challenge (in a good way)!

The upcoming challenge seems to be the length of time required for religion and science to reconcile. So the key would be to show why they should tend toward each other rather than away from each other, especially given requirement for simultaneous practical (lay belief) and factual (cautious informed) dynamics. What coheres intra-religious divergence and scientific-relgious divergence?