I’d say though that what the place of authority in the medieval era does is constrain both reason and romanticism. Reason is constrained both by tradition (especially the creeds) but also a distrust of Aristotle (at least until the era of the Renaissance when the earlier figures like Aquinas finally get their day). Romanticism in particular seems far more constrained than reason, perhaps precisely because by its very nature it’s harder to constrain. You have relief valves in the various festivals where Catholicism appropriated and neutered earlier pagan rites. Within the more formal medieval era it pops up in odd places like Hildegard of Bilgen (sp?) who had that passionate mysticism that was surprisingly accepted by orthodoxy. You also have the story of Peter Abelard and Heloise which becomes so important in the literature of the era. Yet both of those romantic moves are notable precisely because of the ways they are constrained by orthodoxy. The more interesting moves of various Christian mystics like Meister Eckhart demonstrate that from the other side when he’s accused of heresy showing the dangers. Many others were more than accused of heresy and often were killed.

It’s also of note how those medieval thinkers were in many ways brought back to attention after obscurity by the 19th century Romantics.

zjg (8) – Yes, I agree, the changing perception of our ethical predicament is one of the most interesting themes in Taylor’s project. Though yes, he only goes so far in explaining why certain ethical narratives or values appeal to some people as opposed to others. I do think, though, that he does do quite a lot in explaining what makes them compelling, and what catalysts are usually propelling people in one direction or another, based on their exposure to certain narratives, values, or experiences. In other words, his interests are more philosophical and cultural than (merely?) psychological, if I could put it that way, though he is certainly focused on the experiential nature of it all– but from that wider lens, I think.

Jason B (9), thanks for reading!

My own view is that overall it’s a good thing that was broken down but it does lead to a kind of alienation where people don’t feel like they have a place. Romanticism is one move there but you see that feeling of alienation in many places starting in the end of the 19th century but accelerating in the early 20th century. Communism and fascism each in their own way end up being moves to replace this sense of meaning in people’s lives.

Jeff (1), you really should read Taylor. While he’s not doing the same project you are there are a lot of affinities. Basically Taylor argues that the self is grounded with certain heirarchies that arose from late antiquity and the scholastic era that get rejected by modernism. (The Chain of Being is but one example) These then unmoor the notion of the self so it needs to be reestablished. (I’d argue that nominalism does a lot of the work here and that arises earlier but in many ways it’s the widespread acceptance of nominalism that characterizes the modern era)

Taylor does address nominalism at times, but never goes into as much depth as one might expect given his topic. So for example:

Hence the importance of studies which show how the subject was changed through a series of steps involving late Scholasticism, Duns Scotus, nominalism, “possibilism”, Occam, Cajetan and Suarez, Descartes, where each stage appeared to be addressing the same issues as the predecessors it criticized, while in fact the whole framework slid away and came to be replaced by another. (Kindle Locations 4785-4787)

So rather than seeing nominalism as key he sees it more as part of a process where the ground shifts without people really noticing it shifted. A few pages later he notes that among believers Christian nominalism rather than secularism is the residue left behind. He then talks about it again starting on page 12307 (Kindle) where he sees the rise of a dualistic approach (mind against matter) as tied to the acceptance of nominalism.

P (2) I think an implication of Taylor’s thesis is that with the rise of modernism/secularism that there ceased to be a single religious culture. You can see that with the rise of protestantism of course with its endless variety but also pseudo-religious cultures like in say various Hegelian inspired movements like communism.

This is a place where I’d quibble with Taylor although it’d take time to make the argument carefully. That is I think there was often more variety in the pre-modern era than he suggests. Although perhaps he might make the move that these were just the initial fingers of secularism’s rise.

Rachel (3) I’ll confess I’ve not studied romanticism in depth so I may have a lot of erroneous views. But it always seemed like the whole Apollian/Dionysian divide privileged the Dionysian. Maybe that’s just me too influenced by Nietzsche on the subject.

While this gets put on modernism I confess that it often seemed to me the divide happens much earlier in the medieval era where reason is privileged. It’s true that especially in the more mystic movements (whether more on the heretical side or the more orthodox side) you have the rise of eros as found in Plato which we might call Dionysian. However overall to my eyes it’s how medieval society seems so distrustful of what we’d associate with the Romantics of the 19th century that I think that’s where the problem of the divide really appears.

The “resonance” critique found 1) the moral meaning and capacities of the Enlightenment self too diluted, tame, and narrow. Act out of self-interest and voila, you’ve fulfilled your moral duty for the collective good of society and God’s purposes. There was no depth, no true transcendence of your own selfish, egoic nature, no altruism (a theme Taylor explores in Ch. 11 in 19th/20th c. Britain as being a major reaction against the buffered, modern self), no overarching meaning beyond the narrow moralism of following codes of polite behavior for one’s own benefit. So they tried to carve out deeper, more transcendent moral capacities and meanings.

2) The Romantic critique reacted against the division of the self– think Mozart’s Magic Flute, and his binary of the rational, self-controlled, “enlightened” [male] protagonist and the dark, sensuous, emotional antagonist [female]. The Romantic critique rejected this dismemberment or repression of the self, and reclaimed the sides of the self the “reason” had exiled or repressed. It also rejected the atomism of the self and its division from community and from nature and sought to reunify and re-harmonize them.

3) The “tragic” critique overlaps a great deal with the first one–the dilution of moral capacity, etc.- with additional critique against the overall idea of “Providence,” of the cosmos and human nature all working smoothly together for everyone’s benefit; but they differ from axis 1 in how they respond. An Atlantic article I just (re)read yesterday captures camp 3 perfectly, so you might be interested in glancing that over. Those names will come up more in the following chapters. I hope that helps? I did find this section of Taylor’s to be the murkiest, analytically, and he doesn’t always provide very clean conceptual categorizations for what he’s discussing.

What religious culture? Except for a few faithful and a few faithless [so-called] intellectuals, there isn’t one. That’s the problem.

1) The modern self does not have moral meaning.
2) The modern self does not have aesthetic meaning.
3) The modern self replaces messy, organic meaning with the illusion of systematic, mechanical meaning.

Is this about right?