Perhaps this is just me disagreeing over what faith promoting means. Maybe others would disagree but I’d say Adam’s work while not straightforwardly apologetic in the FARMS mold is still apologetic and definitely faith promoting. Admittedly Adam is not usually arguing about facts and that is a big difference. But I think that the FARMS heyday was very open to going where the facts led. Indeed in many ways FARMS revolutionized church theology in a way I don’t think anyone else (McConkie, JFS, and Pratt all included) ever did. Almost always that was because they were more open to following where they thought the evidence pointed even when it went against “sacred cows.”

Now again I do think the big innovation not just in apologetics but in Mormon history in general, is less of a concern for arguing over facts than it is arguing over how things mean for people. I’m not entirely sure that’s healthy, I should hasten to add. I think in some ways it gets back to what I mentioned in the early Nibley apologetics where it just avoids engaging with difficult questions.

The better divide – although again it’s not absolute since I think the lines are far more blurry than people make out – is over a focus on ancient settings to explain texts or a focus on what the text means in terms of a kind of intentionality rather than background.

This is the tradition in which Nibley was trained. Now in a few books he outlines his views, albeit in fairly vague ways. His book, The Ancient State, is probably the best place to see this. In it FARMS collected several of his non-Mormon scholarly works relevant to his apologetics. (And despite being dated they are quite well written) It also compiles quite a few of what I’d call more Platonic essays. Nibley’s view is kind of an odd structuralist account but he sees diffusion as more prominent than common psychology. (That is, common structures are due to the Nephites coming from the mid east and remnants of common old religion) However in addition to this he has fairly platonic conceptions as well. That’s actually pretty common among the more psycho-analytic types of structuralists. Jung is a classic example of that. Although you can also have less Platonic styled structuralists like Cassirer (who opposed both Heidegger’s phenomenology and Carnap’s positivism).

It gets kind of complicated quick – especially since while the structuralists all had common methods there were simultaneously big differences between the different figures. The main thing is that structuralists would look for common structures in cultures and especially their myths or religious texts. These structures would be abstract and would be broken out from the texts, sometimes doing violence to the myths themselves. The way to think of it is akin to the laws of physics being the common structures behind very disparate phenomena. Effectively these people were trying to find the common structures behind psychology, culture and myth.

I tried to find some good introductory links, but most required a fair background. The best I could find was this one “How Structuralism Became Post.” It’s a nice job going through the history and downfall of the movement.

Now if the issue is inference to the best explanation based upon a limited set of academically accepted public evidence, then of course apologetics is fruitless. The problem with that is that I simply don’t think apologists disagree. They just note that what the best explanation consists of changes depending upon what the evidence discussed is. That is they think spiritual experiences completely change the calculus for what the best explanation is found to be. To them at worst issues like horses or steel are more akin to apparent contradictions in science. We may have evidence for contradictory views but presume there is an explanation that reconciles them as we gain more data.

The classic analogy for this would be quantum gravity where quantum mechanics and general relativity simply can’t be universally reconciled. Physicists then come up with speculative notions like loop quantum gravity or string theory that have no empirical evidence. More empirically inclined physicists then get upset at this calling it “not even wrong” since there’s no evidence or even way of testing.

I suspect some speculations by apologists such as horses being a translational artifact are akin to that.

The reality is that if we go purely by public tangible evidence no one should believe the Book of Mormon. It seems undeniable that was intended. (Thus the angel taking back the plates) The whole point of the Book of Mormon is something apparently fantastic that makes a demand to turn to God to find out if it is true. That is it’s very nature is designed to be a catalyst for prayer and personal revelation. That’s not to deny the importance of what’s on it’s pages. Just that I find it interesting how so much of Mormonism hinges upon this functional way to turn people to personal revelation.

That being said, the movement in apologetics toward engagement with facts and sound analysis based on those facts should always be applauded. The sooner we get there the better.