I think I get what you’re saying now too. We could say likewise, do I choose my preferences? Is the fact that I like green more than blue chosen by me? I might make indirect choices that effect the outcome of my preferences, but it seems the preferences are just outward manifestations of the intrinsic will as it encounters data (as filtered and mediated through the body). So also our beliefs may be said to be outward manifestations of our intrinsic will (or the self) as it encounters new data.

In this view, as it is part of the will we would not want freedom from it, or the ability to choose outside of it, otherwise there is no self. What is valuable is what we choose to do with our genuine beliefs. Do we hide from it and enter self-deception so as not to be responsible for our beliefs to some selfish end (fitting in, not risking loss, getting ahead, etc.)? Or do we stay true to ourself despite personal consequences? I think this is the kind of belief that can be counted for righteousness or wickedness. There is no wickedness in being true to one’s genuine integrity which comes of light – whatever degree of light that might be.

I should add that while Peirce rejects authoritarianism, I think the way in the Church we appeal to authority is somewhat different. Not all agree of course. (This is the major place Jeff and I disagree for instance)

The question of when evidence is to the contrary is of course trickier since evidence on its own doesn’t indicate much. It’s evidence as tied to other pieces of evidence and conclusions we’ve already arrived at. To get a bit more philosophical, Peirce sees those conclusions as significant. It’s what he calls realism – the idea of these interpretations as inherently true and in the world.

I do believe that is true. The alternative in light of choice, is that choices are determined randomly. I suppose that could be called “free”, but it’s no freedom of will if I do not determine my choices / my will does not not determine my choices.

Free will cannot exist in a non-deterministic system (meaning if we accept free will exists, then it exists in a deterministic system, which yes, would mean and preserve the scriptural idea that God can and does know the future).

Which in context of this conversation allows that beliefs can both be determined and chosen.

What are some hypothetical ways your answer could differ depending on “why” someone drank the poison?

For me, ultimately, though, it seems that competing desires and understandings are not voluntarily chosen, so at best, our choice is working with whatever “hand” of cards we are given in terms of desires and understandings. So it doesn’t necessarily matter why someone drank the poison — because that motivation, however it competed with the knowledge (or just the perception, depending on if they are right or wrong) that the drink was poison, still wasn’t chosen.

In the same way we can be commanded to believe (or be in a state of belief) but the way we bring that about is told to us in Moroni 10:4 and other places. We inquire and learn in the spirit.

Saying that belief is a consequence of action rather than a volitional choice doesn’t mean that somehow we are not accountable for our beliefs. That’s like saying the drunk who has lost control over their deliberation and reason somehow isn’t responsible when they start the car and drive it. We frequently have responsibility over things we don’t have direct control over. If I leave the brake off in my car and it rolls down the hill and hits someone I don’t control it rolling, but I do control whether I put the brake on. Responsibility is almost always a matter of indirect responsibility.

While I don’t think we need opposition to know, it sure tests our knowledge and helps us know that we know.

I’d add (and I’ll probably go in more detail on this in a subsequent post) that just because one knew in the past it doesn’t mean you know in the future. Our memories are odd things. When we recall we are effectively recreating that memory again with what we understand when we remember it. That means every remembering is transforming that memory. If we are not as in tune with the spirit that means those memories can significantly shift in meaning. One day we may recall an earlier spiritual experience and have transformed it so much, that we no longer believe. That’s why I strongly feel a testimony can only function as a testimony when it is continually questioned and renewed.

And in this system, the latter would absolutely be considered worse than the former.

does that make sense?

I personally have far more respect and appreciation for those who in a trial of faith find they don’t have many beliefs yet persist and stay. I’m all too aware of the things that pull us away from the gospel. To stay always takes a certain kind of faith even if perhaps those exercising it don’t know it’s true.

To your final point, as I said I don’t want to give too much away but I think belief definitely can be a consequence of faith that is practiced long enough. (That’s how I read Alma 32)

The moral value of a belief seems independent of what I’m talking about. I confess I’m not quite sure how to tie morality into things that are not volitional. We’d probably have to discuss what we mean by moral in such contexts. (Certainly we talk of things like an exploding volcano as evil but it seems there’s just a metaphoric connection to the way we say a murderer killing someone is evil)

I think it’s more useful to talk about how strong a belief is. But then as I said it seems the meaning of that can only be in terms of what the belief would potentially do.

As to the difference between faith and belief, I’ll save that for my next post in this series. Don’t want to give too much away.

To what I mean by consequences of belief, I mean that extremely broadly. I’d not distinguish between say enduring for belief, successful action for belief or unsuccessful action for belief. After all what counts is the attempt since success is always always a product of the environment in which I act.