Comments on: Walking by Faith with Popper and Quine http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/ Truth Will Prevail Sun, 12 Feb 2012 07:57:21 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1 By: martin james http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266367 martin james Mon, 09 Jun 2008 13:40:21 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266367 rich rich

]]> By: Rich Knapton http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266287 Rich Knapton Sun, 08 Jun 2008 18:18:54 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266287 Martin, I think that is what I said. "Religious truth is established affectively. It is belief of the second type." Rich Martin, I think that is what I said. “Religious truth is established affectively. It is belief of the second type.”

Rich

]]> By: Martin James http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266273 Martin James Sun, 08 Jun 2008 04:35:19 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266273 Rich, I think your belief in the statement "religious truth is established affectively" is a belief of type 2 not type 1. Rich,

I think your belief in the statement “religious truth is established affectively” is a belief of type 2 not type 1.

]]> By: Rich Knapton http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266271 Rich Knapton Sun, 08 Jun 2008 04:24:15 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266271 In the SEP, belief has the following definition.: “Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term \"belief\" to refer to the attitude [settled way of thinking or feeling] we have, roughly, whenever we take something [data] to be the case or regard it as true.” I submit we have two types of beliefs. One represents a settled way of thinking about data the other a settled way of feeling about data. The distinction is important. For example I may have a ‘belief’ that if I take this data; combine it to this other data I will get an expected value. Can this be falsified? Sure. We can have the wrong data points or the way we combine them will not work, etc. Next, I can go to the restaurant and have a steak. After eating it I state that, in my estimation, the steak was delicious. Can I falsify that belief? Don’t think so. On my way home I almost hit a car. I told my wife, that was scary. Can that statement be falsified. No. Not for that person. To understand the significance of events we must ask “does the belief have personal significance for me or not.” If the event has personal significance for me then the event will be justified (made real) by feelings or senses. These can only be changed with additional data accompanied by affection (feelings or senses). The problem we get into is when we’re talking about beliefs based on ‘data and thinking’ and assuming we are discussing beliefs based on ‘data and affection’. Popper is discussing the first type but the assumption is he is talking about both. Religious truth is established affectively. It is belief of the second type. It has little or no relevance to the first type of belief which is belief data and thinking. This last type is what science is involved in. Rich In the SEP, belief has the following definition.: “Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term \”belief\” to refer to the attitude [settled way of thinking or feeling] we have, roughly, whenever we take something [data] to be the case or regard it as true.”

I submit we have two types of beliefs. One represents a settled way of thinking about data the other a settled way of feeling about data. The distinction is important. For example I may have a ‘belief’ that if I take this data; combine it to this other data I will get an expected value. Can this be falsified? Sure. We can have the wrong data points or the way we combine them will not work, etc.

Next, I can go to the restaurant and have a steak. After eating it I state that, in my estimation, the steak was delicious. Can I falsify that belief? Don’t think so. On my way home I almost hit a car. I told my wife, that was scary. Can that statement be falsified. No. Not for that person.

To understand the significance of events we must ask “does the belief have personal significance for me or not.” If the event has personal significance for me then the event will be justified (made real) by feelings or senses. These can only be changed with additional data accompanied by affection (feelings or senses).

The problem we get into is when we’re talking about beliefs based on ‘data and thinking’ and assuming we are discussing beliefs based on ‘data and affection’. Popper is discussing the first type but the assumption is he is talking about both. Religious truth is established affectively. It is belief of the second type. It has little or no relevance to the first type of belief which is belief data and thinking. This last type is what science is involved in.

Rich

]]> By: Bob http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266260 Bob Sat, 07 Jun 2008 22:17:14 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266260 Too much Word Magic for me! Am I wiser then to have faith in what I believe, or safer to doubt in all of them? Can I really control either choice? Are my beliefs motionless, like the white snow in a snow globe, until an outside force picks it up an shakes it? Too much Word Magic for me!
Am I wiser then to have faith in what I believe, or safer to doubt in all of them? Can I really control either choice? Are my beliefs motionless, like the white snow in a snow globe, until an outside force picks it up an shakes it?

]]> By: Timer http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266252 Timer Sat, 07 Jun 2008 17:03:53 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266252 So I guess Quine would say that if I believe 1. All dogs are mammals 2. All mammals have hair 3. Harry is either a dog or a lizard 4. Harry is not a lizard and I come to believe that 5. Harry has no hair then I deduce that there is a contradiction in the totality of my beliefs, so I pick one of the five to get rid of, and then I'm happy again. But what if I only believe that each of the statements is true with 80 percent probability? Then it is possible to hang onto all of the beliefs (at least, in the sense that I "pretty sure" of each of them) even while recognizing that at least one of the beliefs is wrong. You say, "Well, looking at my total set of beliefs, there are some things that appear to lead to contradictions, but I'm not sure where the problem is -- whether a particular belief is completely wrong or another belief is partly wrong or my logic is wrong or my interpretation is wrong -- and I am still pretty darn sure of each individual belief, though maybe a little more humble and a little less sure about some of them than before." This is seems to be what actually happens when we discover contradictions in our religious beliefs, no? So I guess Quine would say that if I believe

1. All dogs are mammals
2. All mammals have hair
3. Harry is either a dog or a lizard
4. Harry is not a lizard

and I come to believe that

5. Harry has no hair

then I deduce that there is a contradiction in the totality of my beliefs, so I pick one of the five to get rid of, and then I’m happy again.

But what if I only believe that each of the statements is true with 80 percent probability? Then it is possible to hang onto all of the beliefs (at least, in the sense that I “pretty sure” of each of them) even while recognizing that at least one of the beliefs is wrong.

You say, “Well, looking at my total set of beliefs, there are some things that appear to lead to contradictions, but I’m not sure where the problem is — whether a particular belief is completely wrong or another belief is partly wrong or my logic is wrong or my interpretation is wrong — and I am still pretty darn sure of each individual belief, though maybe a little more humble and a little less sure about some of them than before.”

This is seems to be what actually happens when we discover contradictions in our religious beliefs, no?

]]> By: Ron C. de Weijze http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266244 Ron C. de Weijze Sat, 07 Jun 2008 14:38:47 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266244 Mit der Lüge kommst du durch die ganze Welt, aber nicht mehr zurück. - German saying. If you go along with Quine, then I wonder how honest misperceptions and misunderstandings can be criticized. Worse, what if a story is told of which you know it isn\'t true but you cannot prove it when the storyteller doesn\'t test it properly (suggestio falsi) or, even worse, a story is denied of which you know that it is true (suppressio veri). What if this lying is to get a mortgage? In totalitarian regimes people are not trusted unless they lie! Mit der Lüge kommst du durch die ganze Welt, aber nicht mehr zurück. – German saying.

If you go along with Quine, then I wonder how honest misperceptions and misunderstandings can be criticized. Worse, what if a story is told of which you know it isn\’t true but you cannot prove it when the storyteller doesn\’t test it properly (suggestio falsi) or, even worse, a story is denied of which you know that it is true (suppressio veri). What if this lying is to get a mortgage? In totalitarian regimes people are not trusted unless they lie!

]]> By: Martin James http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266228 Martin James Sat, 07 Jun 2008 04:08:50 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266228 For me the twitterpation is the potential to move from a philosophical puzzle to a technological tool. Its an oldie but a goodie. For me the twitterpation is the potential to move from a philosophical puzzle to a technological tool.

Its an oldie but a goodie.

]]> By: Nate Oman http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266219 Nate Oman Sat, 07 Jun 2008 00:50:11 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266219 RW: One other point. I don't think that anything that I have said here denies the possibility of knowledge. Quine argues for holistic verificationism not skepticism. RW: One other point. I don’t think that anything that I have said here denies the possibility of knowledge. Quine argues for holistic verificationism not skepticism.

]]> By: Nate Oman http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2008/06/walking-by-faith-with-popper-and-quine/#comment-266218 Nate Oman Sat, 07 Jun 2008 00:39:28 +0000 http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=4589#comment-266218 RW: Two quick response. First, I agree with you in some sense. You'll notice that I never dismissed the notion of falsifiability. Rather, I was insisting that it is the totality of our beliefs that is affirmed or falsified, and hence our approach to any individual belief is going to be "slippery." Second, I freely admit that I am not up on the neuroscience arguments, but I have yet to see how increased knowledge of brain science presents any special epistemological problem that we haven't already know about for a long time. We know from a little bit of ordinary reflection that physical states can cause mental states, and it at least appears to be the case that mental state, e.g. my decision to begin typing this message, can cause physical states. It seems to me that the issues presented by neuroscience are simply complex iterrations of an old philosophical puzzle. This is not to say that I have a clear answer to the puzzle; just that I am not sure why neuroscience ought to have me especially twitterpated about it. RW: Two quick response. First, I agree with you in some sense. You’ll notice that I never dismissed the notion of falsifiability. Rather, I was insisting that it is the totality of our beliefs that is affirmed or falsified, and hence our approach to any individual belief is going to be “slippery.” Second, I freely admit that I am not up on the neuroscience arguments, but I have yet to see how increased knowledge of brain science presents any special epistemological problem that we haven’t already know about for a long time. We know from a little bit of ordinary reflection that physical states can cause mental states, and it at least appears to be the case that mental state, e.g. my decision to begin typing this message, can cause physical states. It seems to me that the issues presented by neuroscience are simply complex iterrations of an old philosophical puzzle. This is not to say that I have a clear answer to the puzzle; just that I am not sure why neuroscience ought to have me especially twitterpated about it.

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