A few of those bug me too. Some (many?) of them _are_ logical paradoxes within a specific formal model, leading to a rejection or revision of that framework because of the paradox (for example the Ellsberg paradox is a paradox in a model of expected utility maximizers, but not if you allow for ambiguity aversion). Others are only apparent paradoxes and so I think do not get much respect as paradoxes by many economists (whether their author tried to pass them off that way or not).

So I think it is still fair to see a disciplinary divide

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Economics_paradoxes

I don’t think there is a single logical contradiction among them…they are instead models or empirical regularities that seem to defy intuition or might appear contradictory on the surface. Of course, most of them have become absorbed into the discipline to the point where they no longer appear so puzzling to trained economists.

People of “Paradox”: Aristotle and Me.

People of apparent, but not formal, paradox

I think those would be chartbuster titles.

Clark has it about right – or at least close enough that further explanation would require something like 30 pages of linguistic clarifications and historical contexts.

Clark -
the idea that mere “tensions” are paradoxes is a bit more problematic to me

That’s true, but all paradoxes contain tension. So the question is whether these are “mere” tensions or if the tension reaches the level of paradox. Take the liar’s paradox (“everything I say is a lie”) or Zeno’s paradox (which you mention above) – there’s clear tension between the words used, the meaning behind the words and observable reality.

But I haven’t read Givens’ book yet. I plan too, soon (I hope).

However, “People of Tension” sounds too much like a reflexology book. “People of Paradox” sounds cool, even if it is inaccurate.

The idea of an apparent paradox goes back at least to Zeno since his paradoxes make it seem like motion doesn’t occur but of course it is occuring. I believe Aristotle was very influenced by this. Of course I’m not a big Aristotle guy: Ben is.

I believe though that outside of pure logical paradoxes Aristotle was big on antimonies or “dead ends” where rhetoric leads us to an impasse. These aporias or contraries are often the result of our inquiry. Of course here Aristotle is merely following Plato since almost all of the Dialogs of Plato end with just such an aporia and we’re left wondering about the nature of the thing we’re investigating.

So I think Ivan is quite right that the two senses of paradox go back quite a ways together.

If anyone is interested in being bored more by me on this topic, I wrote about it relative to Socratic Method a few years back. I then discussed it relative to Peirce, Socrates, and Derrida.

Let me note that I don’t have trouble calling both the logical and more rhetorical views of paradox both paradox. After all the very inquiry into what really is or isn’t a paradox is itself a study of paradox. However the idea that mere “tensions” are paradoxes is a bit more problematic to me. Although clearly some might be. (Say the tension between Being and Becoming that one could argue instigates and continues philosophy over the millennia)

I am trying to explain why I don’t find it useful and why I think it creates problems talking across disciplines to have the two definitions where one is strictly a subset of the other.

I am interested when you say the idea of a rhetorical paradox goes back to Aristotle. Did Aristotle separate logical and rhetorical paradoxes, and then call both of them paradoxes? I’m asking as I have not the slightest idea.

And, why are you privleging “logical paradox” above all else? You haven’t really made the case that it’s the only true and living way to define paradox – you’ve just assumed it as a given.

The idea of the “rhetorical paradox” goes back to Aristotle (and likely before), so us rhetoric types aren’t just pulling this out of our butts, as you seem to infer/imply/whatever.

Clark, Givens isn’t doing anything like Derridean deconstruction, which is at root a formalist textual project. Givens is far more concerned with context and contextualization, and in that sense is doing something very different.

I’m not sure those end up being different. (Indeed I think Derridean deconstruction is all about context and contextualization)

I think the reason the “poststructuralists” follow tropes of strife is interesting. Of course it goes back to some of Heidegger’s rightly famous musings on strife – especially in the context of Heraclitus. But also is basic to the rejection of foundationalism (which at its heart is a motif of philosophy and knowing as a passive act). Once you reject “givenness” as a kind of pure happening then strife is inherent and we’re led down the road of violence and ethics. (IMO)

In a sense the more Nietzschean approach I mentioned to Ben is a manifestation of this. Nietzsche had, perhaps, a tad too naive near Stoic conception of centers of power. But the basic idea is there. To be is to be engaged in strife.

Art then has a rather unique following from this. (Even if you reject Heidegger’s rather creative rendition of Nietzsche and Art) However in a Mormon context it is interesting since there definitely is a strain of LDS thought that is passive. But an other strain (the eternal progression) that seems to demand strife. These two moves: strife and passivity seem a tad unanalyzed in Mormon thought. If Givens does such an analysis perhaps I ought take up the book.